George Nowlan and the Disparity of Regionalism by Miller, Carman
194 Acadiensis 
mature adulthood and that work on the Maritimes has contributed to that 
maturation. 
COLIN D. HOWELL 
George Nowlan and the 
Disparity of Regionalism 
T H E NOWLAN FAMILY HAVE NO REASON to regret their choice of biographer for 
George Clyde Nowlan, 1898-1965. Sensitive to her subject's Maritime origins, 
Margaret Conrad has drawn a sympathetic, though not uncritical, portrait of 
the popular Conservative Member of Parliament for Digby-Annapolis-Kings. 
Her book, George Nowlan: Maritime Conservative In National Politics 
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1986), is also an informed and perceptive 
case study of the politics of regional disparity, a cause close to the heart of 
George Nowlan. 
The Annapolis Valley, with its strong tradition of individualism, local 
government and congregationally governed churches, has produced more than 
its share of prominent Canadian politicians — Sir Frederick Borden, Sir Robert 
Borden, James Lorimer Ilsley — including George Clyde Nowlan, who came 
close to becoming Prime Minister of Canada during the turbulent last days of 
Diefenbaker's administration. Of the Valley's four native sons only Sir Robert 
Borden has received any serious scholarly attention, the man least rooted in the 
area. In contrast the political career of George Nowlan, born at Havelock, 
Digby County in 1898, of a prominent local family, active in the economic, 
religious and secular life of the community, was shaped by the claims of his 
Valley constituency, which he never outgrew. 
Religion is a case in point. In Wolfville, the intellectual centre of Maritime 
Baptists, where the family purchased a 23 acre farm in 1911, the Nowlans 
became active members of the local Baptist church, increasingly under the 
influence of the social gospel. Here, and at Acadia University, where George 
Nowlan enrolled in an Arts Programme in 1915, Nowlan encountered the social 
gospel's call to social action, to assist society's poor and disadvantaged. In the 
inter-war period Nowlan not only defended the embattled liberal Baptist 
Convention from the assaults of its conservative, fundamentalist assailants, but 
he developed a more than passing interest in the Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation's programme, whose social commitment seemed but a secular 
version of his religious sympathies, a philosophy closer to his personal 
inclination than the arid doctrines of his own party, stultified by political power 
and the Great Depression. 
The Conservative Party had not always been so devoid of solutions to the 
region's economic ills as it appeared in the early 1930s. In 1925 Nowlan, a 
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Wolfville lawyer who had only recently graduated from Dalhousie's Law School 
(after a brief stint as a gunner in World War I), was persuaded to seek a seat in the 
Nova Scotia Legislature under the banner of a rejuvenated provincial Conserva-
tive Party, committed to a programme of maritime rights. Although elected to 
the government benches in 1925 and again in 1928, where he served as Deputy 
Speaker, his party's failure to implement its blueprint for regional recovery led to 
his and his party's defeat in 1933. Worse still, the Liberals, under the inspired and 
progressive leadership of Angus L. Macdonald, had confiscated much of the 
Conservative's social and regional programme. The provincial Conservative's 
defeat and the economic crisis only deepened Nowlan's frustration with the 
existing socio-economic structure, and the inability of the provincial Conserva-
tives to provide answers to the pressing problems of social distress and regional 
disparity. In these circumstances, the left-leaning programme of the federal 
party, particularly after the Port Hope convention of 1942 and the subsequent 
election of John Bracken to the party's leadership, increasingly attracted 
Nowlan's interest. 
Although a progressive Conservative, Nowlan's decision to seek redress of the 
region's grievances within the federal Conservative party imposed serious 
limitations upon his campaign for regional equity, especially under the 
subsequent, and less than progressive leadership of George Drew. At that time 
the Conservatives seemed little more than an Ontario party, for whom regional 
disparity was not a pressing priority. Nevertheless, as a party in search of a 
constituency, the Conservatives increasingly became "a haven for liberal 
democrats who had become disenchanted with the government" (p. xiv), a party 
in which "regional and cultural factors figured prominently in attempts to 
organize political alienation" (p. xiv). In "transforming" the Conservative party 
from being the voice "of the establishment centre to one of the protesting 
periphery" (p. xiv), George Nowlan played a significant part. 
Even before Nowlan first entered the House of Commons in 1948, he had 
established his credentials as a regional spokesman. In Ottawa this phlegmatic, 
jovial, articulate, pragmatic politician quickly consolidated his position as a 
regional power broker, with easy access to the party's powerful Bay Street 
Barons. Although scarcely the most likely allies, or converts to his political 
perspective, Nowlan had no difficulty gaining their confidence, which they 
readily demonstrated by electing him to the party's presidency for two 
consecutive terms (1950-54). Ironically it was the advent of Diefenbaker to the 
party's leadership in 1956, a man whom neither Nowlan nor his Bay Street 
Baron friends particularly liked, which gave Nowlan's regional, anti-big 
business, anti-organized labour, anti-bureaucratic government philosophy its 
greatest chance of success. With a place in both camps, Nowlan was strategically 
located after Diefenbaker's electoral victories of 1957 and 1958 to mediate 
between the party's competing factions. In fact he played the role of mediator so 
well that some of the party's conspirators saw him as the most plausible interim 
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leader to heal the party's wounds, should Diefenbaker be forcibly persuaded to 
step down. 
In power Nowlan was also well placed within the Cabinet and the party to 
grapple with Atlantic Canada's various economic problems. In the end this 
complex task challenged and defeated his considerable skill and imagination. 
All of this Conrad describes with insight in her chapter "Minister From Atlantic 
Canada". Faced with the responsibility of reconciling the conflicting demands of 
the region within the constraints of capitalism, federalism and international 
politics, according to Conrad Nowlan came to accept, perhaps all too readily, 
"the limits of political power in solving economic problems", and turned instead 
"to individual efforts to help his region", a strategy which reaped only limited 
success (p. 250). 
Structural constraints, personal perceptions and political alliances may also 
have hampered Nowlan's ability to resolve the region's difficulties. Too often 
those seeking solutions to the Atlantic provinces' problems see the area as a 
community of mutual interests and aspirations in search of an appropriate 
policy and a perceptive and sympathetic government; whereas the area may 
more realistically be seen as one of conflicting and competing geographic, ethnic 
and economic interests, which can scarcely be accommodated by a single policy 
or a simple strategy, a fact which Nowlan was obliged to acknowledge during his 
prolonged efforts to aid the ailing coal and steel industry in Cape Breton. 
Solutions may also have been hampered by Nowlan's often narrow, parochial 
definition of region, especially in its exclusion of "Acadians, out-port Newfound-
landers, or even a minority of voters in his own constituency" (p. xiii). A realistic 
appreciation of the area's diverse character, needs and aspirations was essential 
to the resolution of its problems. One might also speculate to what extent 
Nowlan's ability to secure federal resources for the region was constrained by his 
close friendship with the Bay Street faction of his party. After all, Donald 
Fleming, Wallace McCutheon and George Hees were not the region's greatest 
friends in the Diefenbaker government: indeed Fleming seemed to pride himself 
upon his success in fending off regional raids on the federal treasury, including 
those in support of the Maritime coal industry.1 
The image of Nowlan which emerges from Donald F Fleming's inflated, 
self-important, two volume memoir, So Very Near (Toronto, 1985) is that of a 
"shrewd, popular and realistic man",2 if a bit too soft on partisan income tax 
evaders.3 Above all Nowlan is seen as a man who had to be, and could be guided 
by the Bay Street Boys. A close friend, Nowlan was Fleming's choice to succeed 
him as Minister of Finance, and in Fleming's view the appointment worked well, 
so long as McCutcheon remained Nowlan's close friend and trusted adviser in 
1 Donald M. Fleming, So Very Near (Toronto, 1985), I, p. 173. 
2 Ibid., II, p. 223. 
3 Ibid., p. 288. 
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Finance and "guided George in the pursuit of policies" which I [Fleming] fully 
endorsed".4 McCutcheon's close collaboration with Nowlan and Fleming's 
retention of responsibility for the International Monetary Fund, and the 
International Bank even after Fleming took over the justice portfolio, created 
the impression of Nowlan as a prisoner of his Bay Street pals. In the clear 
perspective of hindsight, one might speculate on whether Nowlan's attempts at 
regional regeneration may have prospered more had he allied himself with the 
Diefenbaker wing of the party? Nowlan, however, had burned his bridges well 
before he entered Diefenbaker's government, through his efforts to "Stop John" 
from obtaining the party's leadership in 1956, by soliciting the candidacy of 
Sydney Smith, supporting Donald Fleming and even threatening to enter the 
contest himself in order to prevent Maritime Conservatives from going over to 
Diefenbaker.5 Diefenbaker could have had no real illusions as to Nowlan's 
ultimate loyalties; had Diefenbaker entertained such illusions they would have 
been shattered by Nowlan's crucial role in the conspiracy to remove Diefenbaker 
from the leadership of the party in January 1963.6 Perhaps an alliance with 
Prairie protest would have proven a more profitable political strategy than his 
junior partnership in the Bay club. 
Although Conrad devotes relatively little space to Nowlan's private life owing 
partly to "the sensibilities of people still living" (p. xv), she is not blind to 
Nowlan's personal failings. She makes it clear that his informal, off-handed 
approach to problems was often a poor substitute for method and organization. 
Nor does she disguise the fact that his political power was based partly on 
patronage, or that he could on occasion countenance political trickery, including 
tampering with electoral lists, for party advantage. 
While regional disparity was the leit motiv of Nowlan's public career, an 
emphasis scrupulously respected by Conrad, during the Diefenbaker adminis-
tration Nowlan was placed in charge of larger national responsibilities. As 
Minister of Inland Revenue he served not only as "The Nation's Taxman", but 
"The Minister Through Whom the C.B.C. Reports to Parliament", during a 
turbulent and formative period of Canadian broadcasting. Later as Minister of 
Finance he faced complex decisions regarding exchange rates; nor in that 
position could he escape the divisive debate on defence and foreign policy which 
paralyzed public business during the final months of Diefenbaker's administra-
tion. With admirable economy of language Conrad analyzes these issues with 
perception and authority, careful to avoid rehearsing the voluminous material to 
be found elsewhere on these subjects. Occasionally these constraints leave the 
reader anxious for more information, especially on Nowlan's personal relations 
with his Chief, as well as his role in the abortive efforts to remove Diefenbaker 
4 Ibid., p. 528. 
5 Ibid., pp. 324-326. 
6 Ibid., pp. 590-593. 
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from the party's leadership. 
In 306 pages of well written text, Conrad has given us a thoroughly researched 
study of a significant Maritimer, whose efforts to serve his region were 
constrained neither by a lack of committment, energy, political power or skill, 
but a man who remained a captive of his constricted perception of his region and 
a federal and capitalist structure, which he was not prepared to challenge. 
CARMAN MILLER 
Intellectuals and the Canadian State 
"OCCASIONALLY A QUESTION OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS has been raised", O.D. 
Skelton noted in 1932, "— how far is the economist working for a government or 
a business corporation to find his model in the lawyer, accepting and arguing a 
brief, or in the priest, dedicated to the advancement of an accepted belief?"1 
What conflicts, in other words, might arise between the opinions and advice of 
"experts" and either political expedience or corporate profits? When Skelton 
raised this question, at the nadir of the Great Depression, nothing was more 
desperately sought by government or by business than professionally measured 
and rational reactions to economic realities. For politicians and board directors 
alike, macroeconomic remedies for the chronic ailments of the Depression 
became the enticing but elusive panacea of their time. The short answer to 
Skelton's question was that few, if any, constraints would be imposed on viable 
approaches to a seemingly insolvable economic crisis either by the state, which 
feared social collapse, or by private enterprise, which had collapsed. A long 
answer to this question, in terms of the growth of intellectual participation in the 
"inner councils" of Canadian government, forms the basis of Doug Owram's 
The Government Generation: Canadian intellectuals and the state 1900-1945 
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1986), an important new work on the 
history of ideas in Statebuilding. 
While no single thesis emerges from this study, Owram does pursue as a 
central theme the professionalization of Canada's emerging interventionist state 
during the first half of the 20th century. In an engaging narrative, which Owram 
himself describes as a "mid-range synthesis" resting halfway between a sharply 
focussed monograph and a sweeping survey, we are introduced to an eclectic 
range of Canadian intellectuals who, by the sheer force of their ideas and 
convictions, collectively shaped the contours of the modern Canadian state. 
Using a wide range of both printed and manuscript sources, Owram argues that 
1 O.D. Skelton, "Fifty Years of Political and Economic Science in Canada", in Fifty Years 
Retrospect, Royal Society of Canada Anniversary Volume 1882-1932 (n.p., 1932), p. 89. 
